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ABSTRACT 
Darwinism offers a highly abstract and general meta-theoretical framework to help understand 
both natural and social evolution. This framework is of significance for ecological economics 
because it addresses the evolution and coevolution of biological systems and sets of human 
institutions. This paper outlines this framework and charts its historical origins since the time 
of Darwin. It is suggested that this over-arching framework is useful for ecological economics 
as a common meta-narrative within which more detailed examinations of both institutional 
and ecological mechanisms may be placed. Applying Darwinism in this manner does not 
mean that institutions or organizations are explained in purely biological terms: it means that 
Darwinian principles are not confined to biology. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite important adjustments and developments, neoclassical economics has maintained an 
approach to ecological matters wherein environmental policies are ultimately evaluated in 
terms of the utility of individuals.1 In practice, monetary evaluations or subjective rankings 
are used as surrogates for individual utility. An obvious problem with this utilitarian approach 
is that environmental policies are evaluated ultimately in terms of individual satisfaction, and 
some individual evaluations and pleasures may be inconsistent with ecological sustainability. 
Furthermore, if we take current consumer preferences as sovereign, then policy makers will 
ignore the vital task of educating people that their behaviour is ecologically unsustainable, 
and persuading them to adjust their values and priorities. The criterion of consumer 
sovereignty based on existing preferences overlooks the dependence of individual goals on 
their cultural and institutional context. Environmental problems impinge over years or 
decades, and it is unreasonable assume that current preferences will remain constant (Norton 
et al. 1998). Utilitarian preference functions also ignore matters of morality and commitment 
that are vital to deal with environmental problems (Hodgson 1997; Sagoff 1998). 
The International Society for Ecological Economics and the journal Ecological Economics 
were founded in response to these perceived limitations of neoclassical environmental 
economics. Economists and ecologists were brought together to develop theories and policies 
that are superior to those derived from narrow utilitarian and cost-benefit approaches (Gowdy 
and Erickson 2005). 
However, problems concerning common metrics of evaluation remain. A sensible and 
pragmatic response has been to insist on pluralist approaches and combinations of monetary 
and ecological evaluations to guide policy (Norgaard 1989, 1994; Vatn 2005). But ultimately 
different measures must be reconciled to make a decision. 
Darwinian theory does not provide a solution to this problem. Nevertheless it makes an 
important step in the right direction by establishing a common framework within which the 
coevolution of the environment and human institutions may be considered. At least at an 
abstract level, evaluations of the sustainability of ecosystems can be integrated with 
                                                 
1 This paper uses material from Hodgson (2004) and Aldrich et al. (2008). The author is very grateful to Giorgos 
Kallis for comments on an earlier version of this essay. 
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considerations of the robustness of human organizations, particularly to environmental 
shocks.2 
Within ecological economics the concept of coevolution has been the subject of an 
unresolved debate (Norgaard 1994, 2005; Winder 2005; Winder et al. 2005; Kallis 2007). In 
this context the term „coevolution‟ has been used to refer to processes where there is an 
interaction between human culture or institutions, on the one hand, and the biophysical 
context, on the other.3 Nick Winder (2005) and his colleagues (Winder et al. 2005) have 
objected that such a definition is far too loose and covers a huge variety of types of possible 
interactions. 
In response, „coevolution‟ has a broad set of meetings because the word „evolution‟ has 
also in practice been subject to a wide variety of interpretations and connotations, including 
highly questionable notions of predestination, inevitable progress, preformation or whatever. 
With this historical baggage there is little point trying to narrow down either term. It is best to 
use the term evolution broadly to refer to significant change. 
I argue here for the more specific term „Darwinian coevolution‟. As elaborated below, 
Darwinism applies to the ontological case of „complex population systems‟ where there are 
multiple entities struggling for survival with scarce resources.4 Both the social and the natural 
world contain „complex population systems‟. A key point is that the Darwinian principles of 
variation, inheritance and selection are necessary (but not sufficient) to explain the ongoing 
evolution of such systems, including socio-economic systems.5 
Consequently, Darwinian coevolution applies to cases of significant interaction – involving 
in the human social work or the natural world (or both) – populations of entities. Such 
interactions necessarily involve the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and 
selection, in at least on of the two domains. Accordingly, the application of pesticides by 
humans to their natural environment leads to the Darwinian selection of pests. There are many 
suggestions on the way in which the natural world may impact on human culture and 
institutions and their development, including climatic and other factors (Diamond 1997; 
Acemoglu et al. 2002). 
The following section of this paper focuses on the historical development of the idea that 
abstract Darwinian principles apply to socio-economic evolution as well the evolution in the 
                                                 
2 I define institutions as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. 
Contrary to a prominent misinterpretation, Douglass North himself makes it clear that he also regards 
organizations as institution (Hodgson 2006). I define an organization as a special type of institution involving (a) 
criteria to establish its boundaries and to distinguish its members from its non-members, (b) principles of 
sovereignty concerning who is in charge and (c) a structure of command and responsibility delineating roles 
within the organisation. All organizations are institutions, but not all institutions are organizations (language 
being an example). 
3 In a different context „coevolution‟ refers to the interaction of human culture and human genes (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985, Durham 1991). Instead I refer to social-ecological coevolution here. 
4 Scarcity is a central concept in mainstream economics but (with rare exceptions such as Daly 1974) it is rarely 
dissected in detail. It is used here to resources that are not immediately available for an entity: their capture 
requires effort and costs. It does not necessarily imply that a resource is globally scarce, although that of course 
is the reality concerning many physical resources. See section 3 below. 
5 There is an ongoing debate in economics concerning this argument. See Aldrich et al. (2008) for a recent 
instalment of this controversy, with references to opposing views. 
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biological world. Section three outlines the ontological and theoretical principles involved. 
Section four concludes by suggesting how these ideas may have further relevance for the 
development of ecological economics. 
2. Historical background 
It is widely accepted that natural organisms evolve according to Darwinian principles. It is not 
so widely appreciated that the same principles can be applied to the evolution of social 
phenomena, including institutions and organizations. Charles Darwin (1859, pp. 422-3; 1871, 
vol. 1, p. 162 n.) himself considered the possibility that natural selection operates upon the 
elements of language. Darwin (1871, vol. 1, p. 162 n.) also sympathetically addresses 
attempts by Walter Bagehot to apply Darwinian principles to political evolution.6 Darwin 
(1871, vol. 1, pp. 162-6) also proposed that tribal groups with moral and other propensities 
that served their common interests would be favored by natural selection. 
Several scholars followed these hints that the principles of selection, variation and 
inheritance may have a wider applicability than to biological organisms alone, including to 
the evolution of human society. William James (1880, 441) opened a prescient essay with the 
observation of a „remarkable parallel … between the facts of social evolution on the one hand, 
and of zoölogical evolution as expounded by Mr. Darwin on the other.‟ However, his 
discussion was largely confined to the selection of ideas. Samuel Alexander (1892) and 
Benjamin Kidd (1894) also wrote on the natural selection of ethical principles. 
But while several thinkers believed that Darwinian principles apply in this sphere, they 
were applied loosely and incompletely. These earlier writers failed to examine the units of 
selection and processes of replication in more detail, including the possible „natural selection‟ 
of social structures or institutions. When they considered Darwinian selection, it was loosely 
to individuals or collections of individuals. 
Accordingly, these early extensions of Darwinian principles to social evolution failed to 
establish the social units of replication and selections, other than to refer imprecisely to 
societies or groups. It was not explained why human social evolution involved anything more 
than the selection of individuals. After all, the selection or fitness advantage of one group over 
another may simply result from the selection or fitness advantages of the members of the 
more adapted group. In this case, group selection or fitness amount to nothing more than 
individual selection or fitness. 
In the 1890s, and independently of each other, two writers first clearly formulated the 
notion that there were social units of selection, irreducible to individuals, to which Darwinian 
principles might apply. The first of these was the Scottish philosopher David George Ritchie, 
who argued that Darwinian principles of variation, heredity and selection applied to the. 
evolution of social institutions as well as to organisms (Ritchie 1891). Despite detailed 
differences of evolutionary mechanism, the „range‟ of Darwinian theory could be extended 
from the biological to the social sphere. In a prescient passage, Ritchie (1896, 170-1) wrote: 
But in asserting that human society presents many phenomena that cannot be accounted 
for by natural selection in its purely biological sense, I am not denying the truth of the 
                                                 
6 Bagehot‟s essays appeared in the Fortnightly Review from 1867 to 1869 and were later republished in book 
form (Bagehot, 1872). 
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theory, but rather extending its range. There is going on a „natural selection‟ of ideas, 
customs, institutions, irrespective of the natural selection of individuals and of races. 
This quotation contains a path-breaking recognition that Darwinian principles could be 
applied to social evolution and to non-biological units of replication or selection. The idea of 
„extending the range‟ of Darwinian principles to outside the biological sphere tallies with 
what was 87 years later described by Dawkins (1983) as „Universal Darwinism‟. The work of 
Ritchie and others shows that the idea of generalizing Darwinian principles was established in 
the nineteenth rather than the twentieth century. A key innovation by Ritchie was to recognize 
that the units of replication or selection could be social entities such as customs and 
institutions, rather than individuals alone. 
The second scholar to write of institutions as units of selection was Thorstein Veblen (1897, 
p. 390) who wrote that the „economic exigencies‟ of the industrial process „afford the 
definitive test of fitness in the adaptation of all human institutions by a process of selective 
elimination of the economically unfit.‟ Veblen (1899, p. 188) also declared: 
The life of man in society, just like the life of other species, is a struggle for existence, 
and therefore it is a process of selective adaptation. The evolution of social structure has 
been a process of natural selection of institutions. The progress which has been and is 
being made in human institutions and in human character may be set down, broadly, to a 
natural selection of the fittest habits of thought and to a process of enforced adaptation of 
individuals to an environment which has progressively changed with the growth of 
community and with the changing institutions under which men have lived. 
Veblen (1899, p. 207) wrote also in the same work of „the law of natural selection, as applied 
to human institutions‟. The decisive implication was that Darwinism could be applied to 
human society without necessarily reducing explanations of social phenomena entirely to 
individual psychology or biology. As Veblen (1909, p. 300) wrote: 
If ... men universally acted not on the conventional grounds and values afforded by the 
fabric of institutions, but solely and directly on the grounds and values afforded by the 
unconventionalised propensities and aptitudes of hereditary human nature, then there 
would be no institutions and no culture.  
Veblen made it clear that the application of general Darwinian principles to socio-economic 
phenomena does not mean that the latter are explained in purely biological terms. Darwinism 
is too important to be left to the biologists. 
In the twentieth century, similar applications of generalized Darwinian principles to the 
evolution of social entities were proposed by Albert Galloway Keller (1915) and others, but 
the idea fell out of favour until after the Second World War, being revived by the 
archaeologist V. Gordon Childe (1951) and the psychologist Donald T. Campbell (1965). 
Dawkins‟s (1983) later presentation lacks some of the sophistication of earlier accounts, 
relying principally on his vaguely-defined cultural unit of the „meme‟. By the turn of the new 
millennium, the idea of generalizing Darwinian principles to social entities began to take hold 
among evolutionary economists (Nightingale, 2000; Hodgson, 2002; Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2006a; Aldrich et al. forthcoming 2008). 
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3. Ontology and basic principles 
A key step in the generalization of core Darwinian principles is the general specification of 
the broad type of system to which these ideas apply. The claim is that Darwinian principles 
apply to what may be described as „complex population systems‟. Such systems may be 
biological or social. They involve populations of entities. Populations are defined by members 
of a type that are similar in key respects, but within each type there is some degree of 
variation, due to genesis or circumstances. 
Entities within these populations have limited capacities to consume materials and energy 
from their environment and they have mechanisms to process information useful for survival. 
These entities may or may not have a developed brain or memory. They may or may not be 
capable of reflecting on their circumstances and remembering past or imagining future 
behaviours. 
All these entities are mortal and degradable, and they need to consume materials and energy 
in order to survive or minimize degradation. However, because they do not have access to all 
environmental resources at once, these entities face an omnipresent problem of local and 
immediate scarcity, as well as problems of pressing and global resource constraints. These 
circumstances present specific problems that the entities must solve to minimize degradation 
and raise their chances of survival. In short, these entities are engaged in a struggle for 
existence (Darwin 1859, pp. 62-63).  
We assume some capacity to retain and pass on to others workable solutions to problems 
they have faced. The advantages of retaining such problem solutions or adaptations are 
obvious in avoiding the risks and costs of learning them anew. Entities possess some capacity 
to pass on to others information about such workable solutions, providing the foundation for a 
trans-generational cumulative growth of problem-solving „knowledge.‟ This is the basis of the 
Darwinian principle of inheritance, which refers to a broad class of mechanisms, including 
those of „replication‟ and „descent‟ (Mayr 1991), by which information concerning 
adaptations is retained, preserved, passed on or copied through time. 
In sum, a complex population system involves populations of non-identical (intentional or 
non-intentional) entities that face locally scarce resources and problems of survival. The 
entities retain some adaptive solutions to such problems and may pass them on to other 
entities. Examples of populations in such systems are plentiful both in nature and in human 
society. They include every biological species, from amoeba to humans. They would include 
self-replicating automata, of the type discussed by John von Neumann (1966). In addition, 
and importantly for the social scientist, they include human organisations, as long as we 
regard organisations as cohesive entities having some capacity for the retention and 
replication of problem solutions. 
In this manner, at a high level of abstraction, the common ontological features of all 
complex population systems are established, including in nature and human society, without 
ignoring the huge differences of detail between or within these domains. 
On reflection it becomes clear that the evolution of such a system must involve the three 
Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection. These abstract principles do not 
themselves provide all the necessary details, but nevertheless they must be honoured, for 
otherwise the explanation of evolution will be inadequate. 
First, there must be some explanation of how variety is generated and replenished in a 
population. Second, there must be an explanation for how useful information concerning 
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solutions to particular adaptive problems is retained and passed on. This requirement follows 
directly from the above assumptions concerning the broad nature of complex population 
systems, wherein there must be some mechanism by which adaptive solutions are copied and 
passed on. This is the principle of inheritance. Third, and not least, there must be an 
explanation of the fact that entities differ in their longevity and fecundity. In given contexts, 
some entities are more adapted than others, some survive longer than others, and some are 
more successful in producing offspring or copies of themselves. This is the principle of 
selection. 
Selection involves an anterior set of entities, each interacting with its environment and 
somehow being transformed into a posterior set where all members of the posterior set are 
sufficiently similar to some members of the anterior set, and where the resulting frequencies 
of posterior entities depend upon their properties in the environmental context (Price 1970, 
1995; Hodgson and Knudsen 2006b). Through selection a population gradually adapts in 
response to environmental factors. But selection does not necessarily lead to optimal or near-
optimal outcomes. 
A further important point follows from the ontological specification of complex population 
systems. We consider multiple entities, each carrying information relevant for their 
development and survival. Some of this information can be passed on to other entities. Within 
the philosophy of biology, the term „interactor‟ has been devised to describe the entities, and 
„replicator‟ to describe their components that deal with the retention, use and replication of 
relevant information. 
David Hull (1988, p. 408) defined an interactor as „an entity that directly interacts as a 
cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to 
be differential‟. A number of authors have developed and refined the definition of a replicator. 
An emerging consensus is that replication involves a causal relationship between two or more 
entities, where there is substantial similarity between the original and replicated entities, and 
where information concerning adaptive solutions to survival problems is passed from one set 
of entities to another (Sterelny et al. 1996; Godfrey-Smith 2000; Sperber 2000). The 
definitional characteristics of causality, similarity and information transfer are common to 
these accounts, notwithstanding a case for further refinement (Hodgson and Knudsen 2008). 
Clearly, there are cohesive evolving entities, in both the biological and social domains, such 
as organisms and organizations. The question arises as to whether such entities in the social 
world interact with their environments in ways that cause the differential replication of 
relevant stored information. If we consider economic competition between firms, then the 
elimination of some and the prosperity of others leads to the differential copying (by 
collaboration or imitation) of routines, techniques, management procedures, and so on 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). If any of these elements qualify as social replicators, then clearly 
they are very different from biological replicators such as genes. There are crucial differences 
concerning how the information is stored, how it is replicated, and how faithful is the 
replication. The general definition of a replicator has to be deployed with care. Nevertheless, 
there is at least a prime facie case for identifying interactors and replicators in the social 
domain.7 
                                                 
7 Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) propose that many firms have the characteristics of interactors. But this is not 
true for institutions (such as language) that are not organizations. Hence the choice of the narrower term in the 
title of this essay. 
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These conceptual developments help us escape from the vagaries of the „memetics‟ where 
there is no consensus on what the meme is, and whether it is a replicator or interactor. The 
careful definitions by philosophers of key Darwinian concepts point to possible social 
interactors such as organizations, and possible social replicators such as habits and routines. 
Some critics claim that a sharp replicator-interactor distinction is unviable or inappropriate 
in social evolution. They share this stance with others. Those evolutionary economists who 
resist a generalized Darwinism, exclusively gene-centred theorists, and biological 
reductionists, all deny the existence of social replicators and interactors. 
4. Some implications for ecological economics 
Although generalized Darwinian principles apply to both social and biological systems, they 
offer no short-cut theoretical explanations or answers. As in biology, detailed examination of 
the particular mechanisms is also required. Darwinian principles are not like Newtonian laws 
that can predict accurately the motion of bodies through space. Instead, Darwinism is a 
general meta-theoretical framework within which particular auxiliary explanations must be 
placed. The nature of these auxiliary explanations will vary from domain to domain. 
Nevertheless, the provision of this meta-theoretical framework is an important step. In 
particular, the idea of generalizing Darwinism to socio-economic evolution challenges the 
longstanding idea among social scientists that social and biological phenomena should be 
completely partitioned – that social scientists have little to learn from biology and vice versa. 
A generalized Darwinism is consistent with the idea that human society is embedded in the 
natural world and depends upon it for its survival. 
A generalized Darwinism systematizes the process of empirical inquiry and organizes 
detailed knowledge pertaining to a wide variety of evolutionary processes. Furthermore, 
Darwinian ideas have important implications for social scientists concerning the rationality 
and psyche of human agents (Richards 1987). Assumptions concerning human agents must be 
consistent with our understanding of human evolution. Darwinian evolution involves the 
development, retention and selection of information concerning adaptive solutions to survival 
problems faced by organisms in their environment. Darwinism constantly raises questions of 
causality and requires explanations of origin. This applies in particular to the dispositional 
programs behind human thought and behaviour. Contrary to much mainstream economics, 
individuals and their preferences cannot simply be taken as given. 
Crucially, Darwinism focuses our attention on the possible mechanisms through which 
variety is preserved and created. It is remarkable that two of the most important mechanisms 
identified by Darwin (1859) and retained in modern biology involve locational considerations. 
First, the migration of a group to another area with a different physical environment, and 
second the use or creation of different niches, remain two of the most important mechanisms 
to explain speciation. Related ideas would seem to transfer directly to the social or economic 
domain. In these cases the new environment, and the (relative) isolation of a group from the 
majority, create new opportunities for variation. 
Similar arguments apply to human institutions as well as biological organisms, 
notwithstanding the fact that the nature and mechanisms of mutation and separation are very 
different. The general ideas of mutation and physical separation particularly apply to the 
evolution of languages and all sorts of customs. For example, relative isolation and language 
change leads to subdivision and often the creation of new languages. Furthermore, there is 
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now a growing literature on how firms may perform differently in different contexts, such as 
under different regulatory regimes or among different types of financial institutions (Amable, 
2000; Aoki, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Boyer, 2005; Kenworthy, 2006). 
Not only are the above considerations of general importance for understanding the 
evolution of organizations, they are of particularly relevance for ecological economics. Much 
of the policy agenda for ecological economics is a matter of appropriate institutional design, 
to establish incentives that are consistent with environmental goals, to process flows of 
information to guide policy, and to deal with unforeseen disturbances and shocks. 
In this vein there is the important literature on the robustness of socio-ecological systems, 
which helps to identify social and ecological vulnerabilities to disturbances. John Anderies et 
al. (2004) for example identify the link between resource users and public infrastructure 
providers as a key variable affecting such robustness. They develop a set of appropriate 
institutional design principles. 
In line with the Darwinian emphasis on the role of variety in the processes of adaptation 
and selection, C. Dustin Becker and Elinor Ostrom (1995) emphasise the importance of 
institutional diversity in coping with complex developments in environmental systems. 
Similar themes are prominent in a special issue of the Journal of Institutional Economics on 
institutions and ecosystems (Janssen 2006). 
Much of this middle-range literature fails to mention Darwinism. But for similar reasons 
many applied biologists are not obliged to refer to general Darwinian evolutionary principles 
when they carry out concrete studies. Much of biology proceeds by assuming but not 
mentioning the core Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection. Darwinian 
theory is at a high level of abstraction. Middle-range theory has to be consistent with this 
theory but it does not necessarily involve applying it at every turn. Instead, Darwinian theory 
is a way of organising our understanding of different evolving systems and organising 
explanations that operate on different levels. 
Moreover, a more explicit recognition of the role of Darwinism in these contexts may 
stimulate some useful theoretical developments on interactions between organizations and 
ecosystems. Darwinism may provide a meta-theoretical framework wherein fragmented and 
diverse insights may be integrated and further developed. Furthermore, although Darwinism 
does not immediately provide the answers, this unifying framework may help to generate 
some basic principles and policy guidelines that span the social and ecological domains. It 
may facilitate the development of our understanding of the institutional developments that are 
vital to deal with pressing environmental problems, including climate change. 
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